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1 
There is a longstanding tradition in philosophical reflection which 
attempts to draw a sharp metaphysical and epistemological distinction 
between the self and the world. Metaphysically, the self is regarded as an 
entity quite unlike anything to be met with in the world; it is, in some sense, 
outside or transcendental with respect to the world. Epistemologically, the 
knowing self is conceived as a locus of pure thought, set over against the 
empirical world, and engaging with it in an entirely passive way. On this 
picture, no characteristic or activity of the self constitutes the world which 
impinges on its cognitive faculties; its inert and lusterless mind simply 
mirrors, or represents, a rich and active world. It is natural to regard this 
view as a version of realism. Something like this realism seems to have 
been espoused by the early Wittgenstein; but in his later writings we 
encounter a doctrine which is clearly meant to oppose it. This opposing 
position holds that there is a constitutive connection between thought on 
the one hand and empirical reality—in particular social facts and 
language-on the other. The notion of a form of life is what unites the twin 
elements of social facts and language, which Wittgenstein aims to deploy 
as a grounding for thought. For a form of life is clearly a social 
phenomenon; and it also performs a function for Wittgenstein as the 
unique correlate of something linguistic-namely grammar. 1 The idea is 
that a form of life, in its social and grammatical realizations, should 
supplant the realist's dichotomy between mirroring thought and ready-
made world. I shall argue that it cannot in fact discharge this role, 
adducing support for this claim in the context of an elucidation of what 
Wittgenstein's doctrine, when properly set out, must look like. I shall 
restrict myself to what is arguably the test case for the doctrine-certainly 
the case Wittgenstein himself concentrates on most heavily—namely that 
of logical and simple arithmetical necessity. We shall consequently be 
concerned with the form of realism which ordinarily goes under the name 
of platonism. 
On p.226 of PI Wittgenstein writes: 'What has to be accepted, the 
given, is-so one could say-forms of life.' This characterization of forms of 
,Cf. Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), hereafter PI, 
1.19. I shall also use the following abbreviations for the works of 
Wittgenstein: RFM = Remarks On the Foundations Of Mathematics, 
Third Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978); OC = On Certainty (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1979); Z = Zettel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981). 
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life as 'given' is suggestive of an illuminating connection with the 'given' of 
the empiricists. In their case, the phenomenal 'given' grounds perceptual 
knowledge, either explicitly—we consciously construct a conceptualized 
spatial reality from given unconceptualized bits of bare phenomenology— 
or implicitly, in which case the feat of organizing the 'given' has been 
achieved by the time the subject has been constituted as a self-conscious 
experiencer of an objective reality. Now neither of these accounts 
describes a process which we can actually observe going on. This is fetal to 
the credibility of the first account, because it purports to tell just such a 
story. The second account, however, is attempting to begin on an answer 
to the question: how is it possible for a subject to experience an objective 
reality? The question is not meant to be an empirical one, but a peculiarly 
philosophical one; the answer takes the form of a transcendental 
deduction of the necessary conditions of experience. The 'given' then 
enters the picture as the necessary raw material on which the 
transcendental mind gets to work, producing the possibility of perceiving 
an objective world. It is part of the transcendental foundation of the 
empirical world we inhabit. 
The parallel with Wittgenstein Is then this: we might say that the 
existence of a form of life is transcendentally deduced as a necessary 
grounding of meaning (in general, normativity), and hence truth (truth 
attaches to meaning-bearers, i.e., propositions). Hence also, via the 
internal connection between truth and the world, the existence of a form of 
life is deduced as the basis of our possession of a world. We might cast the 
question which the notion of a form of life is equipping us to answer as: 
how is it possible for human beings (or anyone) to measure (say)? The 
answer comes back: a certain agreement in judgments (a common form 
of life) is necessary (PI 1.241). Wittgenstein is careful to deny that such 
agreement suffices for truth, but he nevertheless wants a sense in which it 
is a necessary enabling condition of truth. Like Kant's 'given', it is a 
transcendentally deduced grounding for the activity (normativity) which 
underwrites the possibility of meaningful language, and hence (via the 
connection between meaning and truth) which guarantees our possession 
of the world. 
Wittgenstein's desire here to avoid felling into a naive relativism 
emerges in several places: one particularly striking one is PI Il.xii. Here 
he seems to try to distinguish the transcendental thesis he has in his sights 
from an empirical answer to the question 'how is it possible..?' 
If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, 
should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in 
nature which is the basis of grammar?-Our interest certainly includes 
the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of 
nature...But...we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural 
history...! am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were 
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different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a 
hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are 
absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would 
mean not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine 
certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are 
used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones 
will become intelligible to him. 
Wittgenstein here refuses to say that those who have a different form of 
life embodying different concepts 'would not realize something that we 
realize'. There Is no truth of the matter transcending form of life: truth is 
located within a form of life. But there is apparently no naive 
conventionalism about truth here. Truth does not consist in what the livers 
of a form of life say is true (RFM VI.49). But agreement in judgment, which 
may be—perhaps must be-operative at an implicit level (Z 430), is 
necessary to constitute an institution (form of life, grammar) in which 
meaning, and hence truth and falsity, are possible. 
Wittgenstein claims to have no desire to shake our confidence in the 
solidness of truth: he wants to change our conception of its ground and 
nature. His transcendental deduction of a necessary enabling role for 
forms of life does this in two directions: in OC, he deduces a sort of fixity 
for some empirical propositions: 
I would like to regard this certainty [that it's a chair in front of mel, not 
as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life 
(358). 
Some empirical propositions are held fixed: they are the hinges on which 
the door can turn (Ibid.341); concerning them our eyes are shut to doubt 
(PI p.244). This thrust of Wittgenstein's thought aims to harden the 
empirical. On the other hand, much of his writing is aimed at, so to say, 
softening the non-empirical: but what gets softened is not supposed to be 
'the logical 'must"—which Wittgenstein wishes to keep hard-but, again, as 
with truth in general, our conception of its ground and nature. The new, 
and prima facie difficult, road we have to take involves saying that while 
mathematical truth remains 'independent of whether human beings know 
it or not' (PI p.226), nevertheless it is not simply true that even if everybody 
had believed that twice two is five it would still be four-
For what would it be like for everybody to believe that?-Well, I could 
imagine, for instance, that people had a different calculus, or a 
technique which we should not call 'calculating'. But would it be 
wrong? {PI p.226). 
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The notion of a form of life is designed to help us steer a course between 
the empiricism which invites skepticism and the platonism which 
supposedly imports mystification. ('Don't demand too much [platonism 1, 
and don't be afraid that your just demand ('not empiricism and yet 
realism') will dwindle into nothing.' RFM VII.19.) 
But it is not so clear that Wittgenstein's words entitle him to 
disembarrass himself of the charge of empiricism. Let us return to the 
passage from PI H.xii quoted above. It might well be said that if the notion 
of a form of life is to perform the grounding task required of it then it must 
be possible to imagine different forms of life. This does not mean that we 
have to be able to make good sense of them ('If a lion could talk, we could 
not understand him', PI p.223), but we must at least be able to conceive of 
the possibility of such alternatives (e.g., of a lion talking). This claim might 
look like an empiricist gloss on the notion of a form of life, but 
Wittgenstein is by no means hostile to it. In fact, the possibility of 
alternative ways of 'thinking, speaking, inferring, arguing' is connected by 
Wittgenstein in several places with the anti-platonist thesis, which he 
wishes to endorse, that logic doesn't 'certainly correspond to the truth' 
(RFM 15; 1.115). 
Now PI H.xii exhorts us to 'imagine certain very general facts of 
nature' to be different, and it is natural to read those passages in RFM 
where Wittgenstein considers alternative forms of mathematical or 
physical life-such as 1.5 (The Soft Ruler Brigade) and I.149f (The 
Woodsellers)--as intellectual aids in this endeavour. The Soft Ruler 
Brigade seem to measure all right, but they do not assent to the 
arithmetical equations we assent to, such as 
(S)2+2 = 4 
This is because their rulers expand and contract arbitrarily, so that there 
will be no one number which 2 added to 2 always yields. Wittgenstein 
wants the inexorability of (S) for us to be compatible with its falsity for 
them, and hence with there being no absolute truth which it expresses: 
How should we get into conflict with truth, if our footrules were made 
of very soft rubber instead of wood and steel?—'Well, we shouldn't get 
to know the correct measurement of the table.'—You mean, we should 
not get, or could not be sure of getting, that measurement which we 
get with our rigid rulers. (15). 
But the difficulty is to see how the Soft Ruler Brigade can really be 
measuring: certainly the scenario Wittgenstein suggests for their practice-
-a shopkeeper treating different customers differently-would only be 
possible if they had an independent and rigid standard of measurement 
(otherwise how would the shopkeeper know he was treating people 
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people differently?2). Surely, if the Brigade are really applying their 
measurements to workaday projects like putting up shelves or judging 
long-jump competitions then they will give up their soft rulers for hard 
ones when we show them the superiority of the latter for their purposes; if 
they remain incorrigible, doesn't that show that they weren't measuring in 
the first place?3 Insofar as we are prepared to allow the Soft Ruler Brigade 
their measuring, to that extent (S) seems to lose its hardness. And insofar 
as we are unwilling to countenance their practice as a bona fide case of 
measuring, that is because, as we say, (S) is hard. 
The Woodsellers (who price wood according to the area it covers on 
the ground) prompt the same kind of reflection. Wittgenstein assumes 
that if we come upon them apparently charging a higher price for the 
same amount of wood when spread over a larger area we can 
unproblematically translate them as saying things like: 'Yes, now it's a lot 
of wood and costs more.' (1.150). But really this is not so clear. The same 
trade-off as we observed above surely applies here too: insofar as we are 
prepared to regard the Woodsellers as speaking a language, and hence 
insofar as we are prepared to translate them, we would not translate them 
as asserting such arrant nonsense as Wittgenstein puts into their mouths. 
If we consider such cases from a standpoint initially sympathetic to 
Wittgenstein, we are in fact pushed in the direction of transcendental 
rather than substantial conventionalism.4 We can feel this attraction 
working on Wittgenstein too: for although passages like RFM 1.5 and 
I.149f seem to point unequivocally towards cultural relativism (substantial 
conventionalism), a passage like the one quoted above from PI p.226 is 
suggestive of a more transcendental conventionalism or idealism: there 
Wittgenstein has some difficulty in making sense of a practice in which (S) 
is regarded as false and which still merits the label 'calculation'. If one 
starts, as Wittgenstein does, from a broadly conventionalist position, then 
the temptation to go transcendental becomes very strong when we reflect 
on 'alternatives' such as measuring with soft rulers. We are inclined to 
cling onto the (absolute) necessity of (S) and use it to reject the 
alternatives. If necessity is ours, then it must be so in a transcendental 
sense: that is the only way we have a chance of keeping it hard. Hence if a 
form of life of ours underwrites necessity, it must be our transcendental 
form of life which does so. What is meant by the phrase 'transcendental 
form of life' is the form of life of the widest possible community of rational 
beings: what all such beings who enjoy empirical forms of life have in 
2Cf. Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics (London: 
Duckworth, 1980), 4.1. 
3Wright, ibid., 4.5. 
4Williams, 'Wittgenstein and Idealism', reprinted in his Moral Luck 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1981), p.163. 
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common. (There need be nothing empirical common to all these beings; 
that is the rationale for calling the form of life they share 'transcendental'.) 
We can certainly detect in Wittgenstein's writings an incipient 
yielding to the temptation to go transcendental; in the next section I shall 
consider what coherence the notion of a form of life can have when it is 
read transcendentally. But it is a good idea to be clear how 'substantial' 
many of Wittgenstein's formulations in this area nevertheless are, for all 
his disavowal of the empiricist label.6 Consider his treatment of the 
provenance of necesary truth. At RFM VII. 69 his idea seems to be that an 
empirical generalization is hardened into a rule.6 An example he 
sometimes uses (e.g., RFM 1.9, VII.69) is that of equivalences between the 
imperial and metric systems of measurement. We observe a regularity of 
coinstantiation between, say, 1" and 2.54 cm, and so we dignify the 
proposition 
CD 1"» 254 cm 
as a rule, something which becomes part of the river bank and no longer of 
the stream. The difficulty with this view is that, as we saw earlier, the 
institution of measurement presupposes a high degree of rigidity in the 
measuring systems, so that between any two such systems—even 
supposing they are so isolated from one another that no one ever makes 
the equivalences—there will be an infinite number of necessary 
equivalences like (T). In asserting CD, we cannot be establishing anything 
new, but are merely being faithful to what has been implicitly fixed in the 
setting up of the systems: CD is an a posteriori necessary truth. 
2 
It appears that if substantial conventionalism is the only other 
position on offer, we will opt for platonism every time: as far as that choice 
goes, we will prefer the view that '2 + 2 = 4' does 'certainly correspond to the 
truth'. If a form of life is a substantial convention, it is not able to do justice 
to our modal intuitions.7 But perhaps if we read Wittgenstein 
transcendentally, we may be able to find room for the idea that logical and 
arithmetical necessity are grounded in a transcendental form of life. 
In Kant, transcendental idealism incorporates the doctrine that I-as 
subject of representational experience-cannot have knowledge of things-
in-themselves, but only of representations, or appearances, of these things. 
This is because I can only have knowledge of things firstly through 
intuition, to which I contribute the formal conditions of space and time, 
5Cf. Bolton, 'Life-form and Idealism' in ed. Vesey, Idealism, Past and 
Present (Cambridge: CUP, 1982). 
6And cf. RFM VI.22. 
7Cf. Cassam, 'Necessity and Externality', Mind vol. XCV. 1986. 
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and secondly by subjecting the manifold to the synthetic unity of 
apperception (i.e., I self-ascribe the disparate elements of the manifold of 
my experiences.8) By the time I arrive at a unified experience with 
objective content, the raw material received through sensibility has been 
processed in the concept-applying faculty of understanding: the end-
product owes as much to my 'spontaneity' as it does to the world. Kant 
argues that things-in-themselves lurk behind appearances-they are what 
appearances are appearances of-but that they are unknowable and, in a 
sense, inconceivable: we cannot even apply the categories to them. There 
is considerable tension here between the sense in which things-in-
themselves are nevertheless conceivable (we do at least have to believe in 
their existence) and the sense in which they are not (we can say nothing 
about them; and that means, of course, that we should not even speak of 
'them', for plurality is one of the categories). 
Now obviously this tension is avoidable If we just renege on the 
existence of things-in-themselves; 9 and it seems to me that we can do this 
without losing everything of the transcendental idealism of Kant's position. 
Idealism could remain in the form of a claim to the effect that we can only 
perceive appearances or representations, but now in the sense of 
appearances with objective content or things-as-they-appear-to-us (not 
appearances of anything else); transcendentalism would remain in the 
standpoint from which this idealistic judgment would be delivered. This 
would still be the standpoint of critical philosophy: that is, the standpoint 
concerned with the necessary subjective conditions of all possible 
experience.10 From that standpoint, it would be clear that in order to enjoy 
experience with objective content, we must take our experience to be of 
objects existing in space and time, and we must think of them in 
accordance with Cthrough') the categories, however we set these up. 1 1 The 
transcendental standpoint would look on experience and the world 
8See the Critique of Pure R«son(transl. Kemp Smith; London: Macmillan, 
1929), B.136. Hereafter all references to Kant will be to this work. 
'Strawson's line in The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen, 1966). 
1 0Cf. Walker, Kant (London, Routledge, 1978), ch II. More generally, it is 
the standpoint concerned with the necessary conditions of the application 
of concepts to objects (cf.B25). Even more generally, it is concerned with 
the necessary conditions of the existence of minds in the world. For the 
extension of the notion of the transcendental to the later Wittgenstein, see 
Lear, Transcendental Anthropology' in McDowell and Pettit edd. Subject, 
Thought and Context (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p.269-70. 
"Strawson (op.dt., pp.74-82) offers a compelling simplification of Kant's 
rather baroque structure: object and property survive as the basic 
categories which must be deployed by any subject enjoying experience of, 
or thought about, an objective world. 
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through an idealist lens; but such idealism would be combinable with the 
truth of empirical realism—delivered from a standpoint within our 
experience-that we (normally) perceive objects, not appearances. 
Now my purpose in adjusting Kant's transcendental idealism in this 
way is to render it more analogous to the transcendental idealism we can 
discern in Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life. I have already alluded to 
passages in Wittgenstein (such as PI p.226) which invite a transcendental 
reading. But what exactly is a transcendental form of life? Consider this 
passage: 
If you talk about essence, you are merely noting a convention. But 
here one would like to retort: there is no greater difference than that 
between a proposition about the depth of essence and one about—a 
mere convention. But what if I reply: to the depth that we see in 
essence there corresponds the deep need for convention |=...there 
corresponds a deep form of life.] (RFM 1.74. Cf the 'real need' of PI 
1.108) 
What is this deep need for convention? (What is a deep form of life?) In a 
famous passage, Stanley Cavell talks of our 'sharing routes of interest and 
feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and significance and 
fulfilment..'.12 Jonathan Lear echoes him, talking of our common 'feelings 
of naturalness', 'perceptions of salience',13 and 'our mindedness'.14 The 
transcendental idealism in question takes the following form: the 
necessity of, say, 
(S)2 + 2 = 4 
is underwritten by (or in some sense embedded in) our deep form of life— 
the only (arithmetical) form of life we can understand, and the form of life 
which all genuine (arithmetical) forms of life share. The idealism consists 
in the fact that the truth of (S) is grounded in what we find intelligible 
('...the only form of life we can understand...'), in our deep say-so; the 
transcendentalism enters the picture when we enquire who we deeply are. 
It will be plausible here to answer that we are whoever count as 
participators in a form of life, as satisfiers of the (transcendentally 
deduced) necessary conditions of such participation. And now the 
important point is that such a deduction will specify certain general 
conditions of rationality as constitutive of possession of a form of life, and it 
t2Must We Mean What We Say? (New York: Scribner,1969), p. 52. 
,3'Moral Objectivity' in Brown ed. Objectivity and Cultural Divergence 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p.148. 
"Leaving The World Alone' J.PhU., vol. LXXIX, 1982, passim. 
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Is most likely that such conditions are going to have to include, or entail, 
willingness to assent to propositions such as (S). 
It follows that any statement of the transcendental idealism we arrive 
at, such as: 
(E) the necessity of (S) consists in our being so minded as to assent to it 
cannot be allowed to be construed as recording a merely one-way 
dependence: if the necessity of (S) consists in our being minded in certain 
ways, still 'our* identity cannot be fixed independently of the necessity of 
(S). To be one of us you must meet a rationality constraint; to meet that 
constraint you must think (among other things) that 2 + 2 = 4; it is not 
(conceptually) possible to be so minded as to think that this equation is 
false, because such a 'thought' would, as it were, inhibit the constitution of 
mindedness; hence, 2 + 2 must equal 4. The alternatives are, literally, 
unthinkable. The 'equation' (E) invited us to ground necessity in our 
mindedness, but reflection on what our mindedness must amount to (on 
who we must be), leads us back, drcuitously, to (bare, hard) necessity. As 
Lear well puts it:*** 
After we realize that there is (for us) no alternative possibility of being 
'other minded'...we seem to come back to our original assertion: (2 + 2 
must equal 4]. Thus the strange case of the disappearing 'we'... 
But the 'we are so minded:' does not, according to Lear, entirely disappear. 
Our ability to append the 'we are so minded:' represents a permanent 
possibility of reflective consciousness. (Ibid., p.241). 
At this point it is customary to invoke the saying/showing distinction: all 
we can truthfully say is that 2 + 2 must equal 4. It is not literally true that 
necessity is grounded in our form of life. If that is a truth, it is one that 
shows itself in our form of life. 1 6 Alternatively, we may call it a 
transcendental truth, or 
...a supposed philosophical truth which, if it is uttered, must be taken 
to mean an empirical falsehood, or worse...The dependence of 
mathematics on our decisions, in the only sense in which it obtains-
for clearly there cannot be meant an empirical dependence on 
1 5The Disappearing 'We", PASS, vol. LVIII, 1984, p.238. 
16Cf. McDowell, 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', Synlhese, vol. 58,1984. 
at p.353. 
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historical decisions-is something which shows itself in what we are 
and are not prepared to regard as sense... (Williams, op.cit., p. 163). 
This is the doctrine, and even if we are chary of ascribing it to Wittgenstein 
In anything like such a developed form, there is no question but that his 
conventionalism is not of a straightforwardly substantial variety, and is in 
any case unstable in the direction of this sort of transcendental idealism. 
I hope it is clear now why I rewrote Kant's transcendental idealism. 
For the two positions are now thoroughly parallel. The transcendental 
truths (but empirical falsehoods) are, respectively, that we are inescapably 
trapped behind our representations; and that we are inescapably 
ensnared in our form of life. But the respective 'imprisonments' are not 
really such: there are no objects outside our representations (there are no 
things-in-themselves); and there is no form of life, no way of being minded, 
other than ours. The transcendental truths both deny the possibility-so we 
might put it-of an external perspective on our experience and our 
practices. Such a perspective would be, by definition, a place from where 
things-in-themselves, and the real (absolute) facts of the arithmetical 
matter would be visible. Obviously, if there are no such things, there 
cannot be a perspective from which they are visible. 
The transcendental realist now enters the picture as the person who 
claims that there is such a standpoint, and, further, that from that 
standpoint our perceptions and practices are seen to be in order: we really 
do see things-in-themselves (objects really are the way they appear to us 
all); our arithmetical concepts are in fact 'absolutely the correct ones'. As 
McDowell has put it: 1 7 
The idea is that the relation of our arithmetical thought and language 
to the reality it characterizes can be contemplated, not only from the 
midst of our mathematical practices, but also, so to speak, from 
sideways on-from a standpoint independent of all human activities 
and reactions that locate those practices in our 'whirl of organism'. 
Transcendental realism is, so Wittgenstein on this interpretation believes, 
the perennial disease of philosophis aperennis; transcendental idealism is 
what the therapist prescribes for the sick patient. 
The first point to make about this situation is that it is somewhat 
misleading to present the dialectic as the medical analogy suggests. For it 
is clear from the way I have described the situation that transcendental 
realism is entirely an artefact of transcendental idealism: it is defined in 
contrast to the latter. It is then not a disease which transcendental 
17'Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following' in edd. Holtzman and Leich, 
Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge, 1981), at p. 150. Cf. 
also McDowell, art.cit., note 16, at pp. 351-3. 
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idealism first finds and then cures; rather, the cure evidently creates the 
disease before curing it. (In a curious way the talk of therapy will then be 
apposite: therapy is modernity's cure for modernity's diseases.) The point 
is that no ordinary realistic utterances-such as 'I really do perceive the 
house as it is in itself or 'It is because the square of 13 really is 169 that we 
can be brought to find such calculations compelling'-can be interpreted 
as expressing a transcendental realism (rather than the acceptable 
empirical look-alike) unless they are placed in a context in which it is clear 
that the positions they are meant to oppose are transcendental ones, not 
empirical. 
3 
But given that the dialectic has this general shape, the following is a 
natural thought: surely the optimum position is not to fall into 
transcendental idealism in the first place. For if one avoids it, there is no 
risk of catching the disease for which it is the cure. Better not to get into 
the position where one needs therapy at all: one might get hooked. The 
medical analogue for transcendental idealism should not then be a cure, 
but a drug. Once one is on a drug, it certainly satisfies a need (which it 
creates); but It is better to avoid addiction in the first place. Is 
transcendental idealism avoidable? I think that in the end it is not; but by 
the time we have laid out for ourselves exactly what doctrine it is, it will 
have lost its narcotic powers. It will emerge as an ordinary tautology, not 
the deep philosophical truth it pretends to be. In arriving at the point 
where we can see this, our tactic will initially be to elucidate the standpoint 
of critical philosophy from which the transcendental idealist purports to 
deliver his remarks. 
How does this standpoint differ from that of the transcendental 
realist? It might be thought that there is in fact no difference: both 
standpoints are 'external' in that they involve stepping back from our 'whirl 
of organism' and contemplating It from 'sideways on'. If that were right, 
the transcendental idealist's claim that necessity is dependent on our whirl 
of organism or form of life, and his rejection of his opponent's standpoint 
on the grounds that it cannot be coherently occupied, would be 
disingenuous and self-defeating.18 However, what I have already said 
indicates that this criticism is unfair. The transcendental idealist's 
standpoint is meant to be critical not in the sense of 'external', but in the 
sense of being internal and self-conscious. The ability to append the 'we 
are so minded:' represents, as Lear puts it in the passage I quoted earlier, 
'a permanent possibility of reflective consciousness.'.1® It is structurally 
similar to Descartes' 'cogito' in this respect: a critical conclusion (sum) is 
18As Cassam claims it is in art.cit., at pp.454-6. 
19Art.dt., note 15, p. 241. My emphasis. 
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reached through self-consciousness (cogito) and without stepping outside 
an internal first-person perspective. For Descartes, the first-person 
perspective is singular; for Wittgenstein, it is plural. 
In the same way, the Kantian 'I think' must be able to accompany all 
my representations: from a critical standpoint I realize both that all my 
representations must be subject to whatever condition enables them to be 
mine (that I must bring them under a synthetic unity of apperception, and 
in so doing conceptualize the sensibly given), and that I cannot look 
behind my representations and perceive things-ln-themselves (i.e., things 
that are not inherently available to me). This exactly parallels the 
Wittgensteinian thought (as presented by Lear, McDowell and others) 
that all our truths, including our necessary truths, are ours; we cannot 
recognize a truth we cannot recognize, and in our recognizing a truth, it 
becomes a truth for us. (I cannot see an object I cannot see; and in the 
possibility of my seeing it it becomes an object for me, ceases to be an 
object in-itself.) 
When the transcendental idealisms of the Kantian and 
Wittgensteinian positions are finally set down, they are accordingly seen 
to be analytic (as Kant acknowledges for his own version, B.138). This was 
implicit in our earlier observation that we could not gain leverage on the 
left-hand side of: 
(E) The necessity of *2 + 2 = 4' consists in our being so minded as to 
assent to it. 
via the right-hand side. This fact reduces (E) to a mere tautology. It follows 
that the transcendental realist must be construed as assenting to a 
contradiction: he must claim that there are objects-which-we-cannot-see, 
and that we see them; that there are necessities-which-we-cannot-assent-
to (because we cannot understand them), and that we assent to them. This 
brings out the real nature of the external perspective which, it is said, 'we 
tend, confusedly, to suppose that we occupy'2" when we are impressed by 
transcendental realism. It is a perspective with an inbuilt contradiction. 
This realist is at one and the same time drawing a boundary to what we can 
see or understand, and allowing us to trespass beyond it. 
Clearly, if 'we' are defined (at least partly) in terms of those who can 
understand necessities, there cannot be any avoiding the bare tautology 
that necessities must be comprehensible by us. But the claims of 
philosophical interest made on behalf of the tautology, and which are 
associated with the label 'transcendental idealism', are avoidable. There 
is, in particular, nothing in the tautology to justify talk of 'whirl of organism' 
or 'form of life': these phrases seem to promise something substantial in 
^McDowell, artxit., note 17, p. ISO. 
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the way of foundation or grounding for necessity, but in the event do not 
deliver it. Cavell writes that: 
Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing 
more, but nothing less, than [forms of life]. It is a vision as simple as it 
is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying.21 
But we have to reply to this that when the notion of a form of life or whirl of 
organism is shorn of the empirical content which it seems to carry in 
Cavell's description; when, that is to say, it is made suitably transcendental, 
what Cavell says is simply false. And there is no philosophical truth 
shadowing this falsehood-there is just falsehood. Necessity does not rest 
on form of life; the dependence is in fact, as we have seen, the other way 
round. The membership of the transcendental community-the 'we' of the 
'we are so minded:'—is collected on the basis of assent to antecedently 
given necessities (among other things). But there is no reverse 
dependency: we do not arrive at the necessities by inspecting what we are 
prepared to assent to. If we did that we should have to rely on an empirical 
'we', and then we should have a substantial conventionalism. 
In missing the tautological character of transcendental idealism, 
proponents of it have consequently also misrepresented their 
transcendentally realistic opponent. McDowell ascribes to him 
the idea that provable correctness characterizes exercises of reasons 
in which it Is, as it were, automatically compelling, without 
dependence on our partially shared 'whirl of organism'.22 
But the dependence which McDowell wants is, as we have seen, simply not 
there to be had. Rather, the dependence is the other way round: what 
holds our whirl of organism together is (among other things) the automatic 
compulsoriness of mathematical proof and necessity. Pose Cavell and 
McDowell, there is no vertigo to be felt (or only by an empirical idealist); 
no feeling of human organism being all that keeps the rationality show on 
the road. Quite the reverse: the old picture of the mind engaging with 
universalis! rails has not in fact been supplanted by our transcendental 
idealism, but merely supplemented, and supplemented by a tautology. 
We have not escaped, after all, from the crystalline purity—the sublimity— 
of the logic of our language (PI 1.89, 1.105-8). To suppose that the sheer 
tautology which transcendental idealism serves us up takes us off the ice 
onto the rough ground (ibid., 1.1.07) is an illusion: when we do logic we are 
on Ice. But so far from existing apart from us in inhuman alienation, the 
2,Cavell,0.cit.,p.52. 
^McDowell, o. dt., p. 152. 
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crystalline purity of logic is the very thing that personalizes us: it is 
precisely our (or anyone's) ability to make contact with the normative rails 
along which rules inexorably run that constitutes us (or anyone) as persons 
(rational beings) at all. 
The platonist's claim is that universale have, so to speak, a life of their 
own. What is meant by this is that the rules which universals and their 
inter-relations embody possess a compulsoriness or normativity to which 
we make no contribution, and which is simply ineluctable. It is quite 
natural to represent such rules as rails laid out independently of the say-so 
of the track-users; this picture is not misleading so long as it is borne in 
mind that the rails are normative, not mechanical. That there is no 
mechanical surrogate for normativity is something which Wittgenstein is 
at some pains to show; but there is no warrant for accusing the platonist of 
offering a mechanistic account of rule-following. The most which the 
platonist wants is the automatic compulsoriness of rules: he is by no 
means committed to a mechanistic view of how they compel.23 
^Wittgenstein is followed in his slur on the platonist by many of his 
commentators including, recently. Pears (The False Prison; Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1987). See especially pp.9-11,59-60. The mistake is made in the 
following passage, for example: 
(The platonist's rails] would be no use, because the speaker's mind 
would have to contain something-an image perhaps, or a formula— 
which would be both strictly contemporary and also a self-contained, 
unambiguous representation of the infinite line dividing positive from 
negative instances; which is impossible, (pp.59-80) 
But of course the platonist's rails are not designed to be of use; they are 
intended to give expression to the independent compulsoriness of rules— 
to the fact that nothing in the way of what counts as obeying or disobeying 
a rule is up to us. And that is correct. 
The view that understanding consists in the possession of a formula 
(considered as a syntactic object) or a mental image—a view which comes 
under heavy and merited attack in the pages of P/-is not a platonist thesis. 
To be in a state of understanding is to engage with the platonist's rails in 
the sense of being in an infinitistic state: that state cannot, as Wittgenstein 
cogently argues, be identified with a merely occurrent mental state, such 
as the possession of an image or the recitation to oneself of a formula. This 
is because a merely occurrent state—conceived simultaneously as 
inBnittsitic-would have to drive its applications mechanically or at least 
causally; but there is no causal surrogate for the normative, and 
normativity is precisely what characterizes the way states of understanding 
relate to their applications. The attempt by Wittgenstein's interlocutor to 
bridge the gap between the mechanical and the normative only produces 
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the fantastic and unlovely notion of the supermechanical. But platonism 
is not fantastic: that would be for normativity itself to be fantastic. Of 
course Wittgenstein does not wish to be saddled with this intolerable 
conclusion; but the attempt to incorporate a contribution from the rule-
followers into the nature of rules cannot fail to foist it on him. It is just as 
misguided on his part as the attempt, which he rightly castigates, to 
mechanize the normative. 
Perhaps I should say a bit more about the incoherence of the notion of 
supermechanism. (Some of the relevant passages in Wittgenstein are PI 
1.192ff, RFM 1.118-30, Z 296.) The point is that if a rule determined its 
applications causally, it would be possible to build a machine which was 
guaranteed to follow a rule. But it is not so possible, because a machine 
may always, as we say, malfunction, whereas it cannot fail to behave 
mechanistically or causally. We are tempted at this point to hypothesize 
an ideally rigid machine, a machine which can only move in such-and-
such ways, and so is guaranteed to follow a rule. But a machine which 
cannot malfunction is a philosophical fiction. You cannot get to the 
normative by 'hardening* the mechanical (by positing ideal processes 
which are still mechanical). The normative is not the supermechanical; a 
rule-follower is not a supermachine. Rather, the normative is different in 
kind from the causal or mechanical: the connection between a rule and its 
applications is constitutive, or logical, and not causal (Wittgenstein is 
inclined, misleadingly, to say that it is a matter of grammar. See, e.g., RFM 
1.128). There is an excellent discussion of the failure of the mechanical 
model of rule-following in Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), at pp.22-30. But the consequence of 
rejecting the mechanistic model of rule-following is not, as Kripke 
supposes, an unavoidable skepticism about our ability to follow rules; on 
the contrary, it is to replace an erroneous way of regarding rule-following 
with a just perception of it: 
How queer: it looks as if a physical (mechanical) form of guidance 
could misfire and let in something unforeseen, but not a rule (Z 296). 
The queerness alluded to here derives from supposing that rule-following 
is a mechanical process; jettison that assumption and the queerness 
vanishes. Machines and rules will then be seen to 'guide' in quite different 
senses (cf. PI 1.195). (See McDowell, art.cit., note 16, for a good analysis of 
what is wrong with Kripke's 'skeptical paradox' and 'skeptical solution'.) 
Nothing in this discussion prejudges the question whether a grasp of 
the phenomenon of normativity can be realized in a causal system. This is 
a quite separate issue. Granted that the ability to follow a rule does not 
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We are faced, after all, with a ready-made world. We have seen that 
an acceptable transcendental idealism can do no more than supplement 
an otherwise healthy platonism with the truism that rules compel us (= all 
those compelled by the rules). No platonist would wish to demur at such 
an appendix to his position. But while we cannot dissent from the 
tautology, we can deny it the significance which writers, following 
Wittgenstein, have wanted to build into it. And we can reinstate realism 
about objects and necessity without falling into transcendental realism. 
This doctrine, revealed as a contradiction, also loses philosophical interest; 
and it becomes extremely unlikely that any philosopher has ever assented 
to it 
The notion of a transcendental form of life has thus been emptied of 
content: there is nothing to set against it; we cannot contrast another form 
of life with it to get some idea of what it is not. And in any case it cannot 
play the supportive role it was suborned for. In terms of the 
saying/showing distinction, we can say that there is no transcendental 
point of view which we as the transcendental community-to whom certain 
transcendental truths (but empirical falsehoods) make themselves 
manifest-inhabit. This reflects the tautological nature of transcendental 
idealism. For there is nothing unsayable about a tautology: the 
transcendental truth that the world we live in is our world is not empirically 
false and hence at best showable but not sayable. It is not an empirical 
statement at all: the 'our' in it is transcendental, and the statement as a 
whole is tautological because our world just is, when all's said, the world.24 
consist in the possession of a set of causal dispositions (to any degree of 
complexity); nevertheless it seems quite plausible that the notion of a rule 
is potentially graspable by any machine complex enough to possess 
second-order dispositions. Such a machine is at least in a position (given 
suitable further complexity) to grasp the notion of the correct application 
of a rule; of course it is not guaranteed against breakdown, but then no 
rule-follower ever is. What it is to follow a rule is not a mechanical matter; 
but machines can follow rules: they can do so if (among other things) they 
can review critically their own functional dispositions. (Of course those 
reviewing dispositions can break down: machines can 'go mad.') 
2 4I have been helped in writing this paper by conversations with John 
McDowell and David Wiggins. 
